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Sovereign Immunity for Rent: How the
Commodification of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity Reflects the Failures of the
U.S. Patent System
Katrina Grace Geddes*
Last year, a Fortune 500 pharmaceutical company attempted to
rent the sovereign immunity of an American Indian tribe in order to
shield its patents on a dry-eye drug from invalidation by generic
competitors in inter partes review. Pharmaceutical firms are
notorious for pursuing unconventional methods to extend the
duration of their patents and, in this sense, the maneuver is
unsurprising. The exploitation, however, of an historically
disenfranchised community with limited economic opportunities is
particularly unsettling. This Article will provide, firstly, a factual
summary of the legal background of this case; secondly, a review of
the February 2018 decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(“PTAB”) to deny the application of tribal sovereign immunity in
this case; thirdly, a review of the July 2018 decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, affirming the PTAB’s
decision; fourthly, a discussion of the ways in which the precedent
set by Allergan’s maneuver may adversely affect consumer welfare
by undermining the process of inter partes review; fifthly, an
analysis of the history of tribal sovereign immunity and how its
exploitation in this case reflects the historic oppression of American
Indians; and finally, strategies to deter such transactions from
recurring in the future.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Allergan’s dry-eye treatment Restasis® was approved in 2002,
and its patents (issued in 1995 and 1999)1 were set to expire in 2014.
However, in 2013, Allergan obtained new patents claiming new uses
of the drug, thereby extending patent protection to 2024.2 In 2015,
Allergan filed suit against Teva Pharmaceuticals, Akorn, and
Mylan, alleging that each of the generic manufacturers had infringed
their Restasis® patents by filing Abbreviated New Drug
Applications (“ANDAs”) for bioequivalent drugs.3 The defendants
responded that the Restasis® patents were invalid on several
grounds, and, in October 2017, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas agreed that the patents were invalid for
obviousness.4 Allergan is appealing the court’s ruling, which will
now be heard by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.5
1

U.S. Patent No. 5,474,979; U.S. Patent No. 5,981,607.
See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL
4803941, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
3
Id. at *13.
4
Id. at *65.
5
Press Release, Allergan, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas Issues
Adverse Trial Decision Concerning RESTASIS® (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion)
0.05% Patents (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/us-district-court-for-the-eastern-district-of-tex [https://perma.cc/9QW3-2WDJ]. An appeal
2
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Meanwhile, on June 3, 2016, Mylan filed six inter partes review
(“IPR”) challenges with the PTAB regarding the Restasis® patents,6
and, on December 8, 2016, the PTAB granted its petitions to be
heard. On September 8, 2017, less than a week before the oral
hearing set for September 15, counsel for the Saint Regis Mohawk
Tribe (“the Tribe”) contacted the PTAB to inform the Board that
they had acquired the challenged patents and sought a motion to
dismiss the proceedings based on the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.7
On September 8, 2017, the Tribe had entered into a patent
assignment agreement with Allergan in which the latter had
transferred to the former a set of U.S. patents and patent applications
related to Restasis®.8 On the same day, both parties also entered into
a Patent License Agreement in which the Tribe granted Allergan “an
‘irrevocable, perpetual, transferable, and exclusive license’ under
the challenged patents ‘for all FDA-approved uses in the United
States.’”9 In exchange, Allergan paid the Tribe $13.75 million and
promised $15 million in royalties annually.10 “The License
Agreement expressly stated that the Tribe ‘will and shall assert its
sovereign immunity in any Contested PTO Proceeding, including in
the IPR Proceedings.”11
In the media storm that followed this announcement, amicus
briefs were filed before the PTAB by a variety of different
commentators and interest groups. The Software Alliance
highlighted the irrelevance of patent immunity to the preservation

was filed on November 1, 2017. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 18-1130
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2018).
6
U.S. Patent No. 8,685,930; U.S. Patent No. 8,629,111; U.S. Patent No. 8,642,556;
U.S. Patent No. 8,633,162; U.S. Patent No. 8,648,048; U.S. Patent No. 9,248,191.
7
Elana Williams, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Defense in Overcoming IPR
Challenges of Brand Name Pharmaceutical Patent Validity at PTAB—Effects on the
Industry, 18 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 40 , 57 (2018) at 48.
8
Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-01127, at 5, 2018 WL
1100950, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
9
Id. at 6.
10
Id.
11
Caleb A. Bates et al., Sovereign Immunity and Inter partes Review, KNOBBE MARTENS:
BIOTECH. BLOG (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.knobbe.com/news/2017/10/sovereignimmunity-and-inter-partes-review [https://perma.cc/SDH2-Q9QW].
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of tribal sovereignty for self-governance,12 while the Public
Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier Foundation argued that IPR
is a public-interest administrative proceeding with broader societal
ramifications, unlike private litigation.13 The Association for
Accessible Medicines echoed these sentiments, calling on the PTAB
to protect the public’s paramount interest in containing patent
monopolies within their legitimate scope.14 On the other side, the
Oglala Sioux Tribe called for greater respect for tribal decisions
regarding revenue streams, economic development, and financial
self-sufficiency.15 Similarly, the Seneca Nation called for continued
deference to Congress regarding the abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity.16 The Native American Intellectual Property Enterprise
Council emphasized the “vital support” offered by the patent
assignment to “one of the groups in most need of economic and
educational assistance in the United States.”17 Inventor advocacy
organization U.S. Inventor, LLC emphasized that only Congress has
the authority to qualify or limit tribal sovereign immunity,18 and the
National Congress of American Indians, the National Indian
Gaming Association, and the United South and Eastern Tribes
highlighted the shared common law origins of state and tribal
sovereign immunity and the importance of deference to Congress
regarding their abrogation.19 Patent attorneys Luis Ortiz and Kermit
Lopez emphasized that sovereign immunity is a core legal
12

Brief of BSA The Software All. as Amicus Regarding Applicability of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity in IPR Proceedings at 5, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127.
13
Brief of Pub. Knowledge and the Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Collegii in
Opposition to the Motion to Terminate at 2–3, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127.
14
Brief of the Ass’n for Accessible Meds. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
2, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127.
15
Brief of the Oglala Sioux Tribe as Amicus Curiae in Support of Corrected Patent
Owner’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity at 5, Mylan Pharm., No.
IPR2016-01127 [hereinafter Oglala Sioux Tribe Brief].
16
Brief of the Seneca Nation as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Patent Owner, Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe at 2, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127.
17
Brief of Native Am. Intellectual Prop. Enter. Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Regarding Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss at 6, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127
[hereinafter NAIPEC Brief].
18
Brief of U.S. Inventor, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Patent Owner, the Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe at 5–6, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127.
19
Brief of the Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians et al. as Amici Curiae in support of Patent
Holder the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Mylan Pharm., No. IPR201601127.
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protection for American Indian tribes, and claimed that the PTAB
“has no congressional imprimatur to determine whether tribal
sovereign immunity applies in an IPR.”20
The case also received significant attention from non-legal
stakeholders, including a coalition of prominent U.S. health care
organizations, led by America’s Health Insurance Plans, American
Hospital Association, and American College of Physicians. This
coalition urged congressional leaders to “fully examine” Allergan’s
“brazen attempt to circumvent U.S. law” that, if left unchallenged,
could “represent the beginning of a lucrative business strategy at the
expense of the public interest; thus jeopardizing timely access to
lower-cost generic and biosimilar medicines.”21 In March 2018,
Senators Tom Cotton, Claire McCaskill, David Perdue, Joni Ernst,
and Pat Toomey introduced the “Preserving Access to Cost
Effective Drugs Act,” which would prevent patent holders from
asserting sovereign immunity as a defense in any reexamination
proceeding, including any appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, any inter partes review, any post-grant review, or any
subsequent review of any of these proceedings by a U.S. court.22
The bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.23
On February 23, 2018, the PTAB delivered its decision denying
the Tribe’s motion to terminate inter partes review on the basis of
its tribal sovereign immunity. The Board held that “the Tribe has not
established that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity should be
applied to these proceedings. Furthermore, we determine that these
proceedings can continue even without the Tribe’s participation in
view of Allergan’s retained ownership interests in the challenged
patents.”24 The details of this judgment are elucidated in Section III.
Following this decision, Allergan appealed to the U.S. Court of
20

Brief of Luis Ortiz and Kermit Lopez as Amicus Curiae in Support of Patent Owner’s
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity at 11,
Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127.
21
All. of Cmty. Health Plans et al., Health Care Organizations Letter on Allergan
Restasis,
ASS’N FOR ACCESSIBLE MEDS.
1,
3
(Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/Health-Care-OrganizationsLetter-on-Allergan-Restasis-10-10-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KFH-EJPT].
22
Preserving Access to Cost Effective Drugs Act, S. 2514, 115th Cong. (2018).
23
See S.2514, 115th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 7, 2018).
24
Mylan Pharm, No. IPR2016-01127, at 4, 2018 WL 1100950, at *2.
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which heard oral arguments on June
4, 2018.25 During the hearing, the court explored the question of
whether inter partes review represents a reconsideration of an
administrative agency’s prior decision or whether it more closely
resembles civil litigation between two private parties.26 Jonathan
Massey, representing Allergan, argued that inter partes review
“bears all the trappings of a federal civil action” and therefore that
tribal sovereign immunity should apply.27 Eric Miller, for the
defendants, argued that there were two critical features that
distinguished IPR from civil litigation: firstly, how the process
begins (the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) has discretion to deny an IPR petition, unlike the
adjudicator in a civil suit); and secondly, how the process ends (in
an IPR, the only possible outcome for the patentee is the cancellation
of a public franchise issued by an administrative agency).28 Miller
argued that the consequence of the USPTO Director’s decision to
initiate an IPR is not that the Tribe is hailed into court by a private
party, but that “a politically accountable official at an executive
branch agency has made a decision” to reconsider a prior agency
action.29
Mark Freeman, representing the U.S. Department of Justice,
agreed that “just because the petition . . . was begun by a petition by
a private party that it was the private party’s cancellation of the
patent.”30 Freeman reiterated that “it’s the USPTO’s decision to
reconsider [the grant of a patent],” and “because this is our decision,
for which we are accountable, it is an act of the United States
government, against which an Indian tribe does not have sovereign
immunity.31 And for that reason, we would urge the court to hold
that the Board correctly said this proceeding can proceed.”32
25

See Oral Argument, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (No. 2018-1638), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argumentrecordings?title=&field_case_number_value=18-1638&field_date_value2%5Bvalue
%5D%5Bdate%5D= [https://perma.cc/5VH9-R9PQ].
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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Although the court expressed skepticism at the oral arguments for
both sides, it agreed that the “strongest argument” for the defendants
was “the discretion of the [USPTO] director to initiate the
proceeding or not.”33 The court also made several references to the
harmful precedent set by the “deliberate circumvention of the IPR
process by buying sovereign immunity,” asking Massey, “many
pharmaceutical or other companies could simply enter into the same
type of transaction with an Indian tribe, where does that leave the
IPR process?” Freeman also described the transaction as a “shell
game” and encouraged the court to preserve the Board’s decision.34
On July 20, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit handed down its judgment, affirming the PTAB’s decision
to deny the Tribe’s motion to terminate inter partes review on the
basis of its tribal sovereign immunity. The details of this judgment
are explored in Section IV.
II. DECISION OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s February 2018 decision
can be summarized in four parts:
 There is no controlling precedent or statutory
basis for the application of tribal immunity in
inter partes review proceedings;
 Tribal immunity does not apply to inter partes
review proceedings;
 These particular proceedings may continue with
Allergan’s participation; and
 The Tribe is not an indispensable party.
With respect to its first assertion, the Board found that, although
case law had established that state sovereign immunity can be
exercised as a defense in adjudicatory proceedings before federal
agencies,35 the Tribe had failed to provide any federal court or Board

33

Id.
Id.
35
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 743–44 (2002) (“State
sovereign immunity’s preeminent purpose—to accord States the dignity that is consistent
with their status as sovereign entities—and the overwhelming similarities between FMC
34
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precedent suggesting that this principle should be extended to an
assertion of tribal sovereign immunity in similar proceedings.36
Furthermore, the Board highlighted statements by the Supreme
Court that “‘the immunity possessed by Indian tribes is not
coextensive with that of the States.’”37 Finally, the Board was
reluctant to permit the application of non-statutory defenses in IPR
proceedings.38 In view of the differences between tribal and state
sovereign immunity, the absence of relevant precedent, and the lack
of statutory authority, the Board declined the Tribe’s request to
invoke tribal sovereign immunity as a defense in the inter partes
review.39
With respect to its second assertion, the Board exhibited strong
deference to Congress with respect to the scope of applicability of
federal laws to Indian tribes. The Ninth Circuit has stated that:
[A] federal statute of general applicability that is
silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes
will not apply to [Indian tribes] if: (1) the law touches
“exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters”; (2) the application of the law to
the tribe would “abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian
treaties”; or (3) there is proof “by legislative history
or some other means that Congress intended [the
law] not to apply to Indians on their
reservations . . . .”40
The Board found that, as none of these requirements had been
met in this particular case, there was no basis for finding that the
generally applicable America Invents Act was not applicable to

adjudicative proceedings and civil litigation lead to the conclusion that the FMC is barred
from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a nonconsenting State.”).
36
Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 8, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3.
37
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998); see also Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877,
890 (1986).
38
Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 10, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4.
39
Id.
40
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (second
alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890,
893–94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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Indian tribes.41 Furthermore, Indian tribes have generally “not
enjoyed immunity in other types of federal administrative
proceedings used to enforce generally applicable federal statutes.”42
With respect to its third assertion, the Board explained that
reconsideration of the patentability of issued patents via inter partes
review is possible “without regard to the identity of the patent
owner” because the Board does not exercise personal jurisdiction
over the patent owner.43 It cannot restrain the patent owner from
acting, nor compel it to act in any manner based on its final decision;
the scope of the Board’s authority is limited to assessing the
patentability of the challenged claims.44 The patent owner cannot be
compelled to appear as a party in the proceedings, and numerous
inter partes reviews have proceeded to a final written decision
without the patent owner’s participation.45 Accordingly, the Board
held that, even if the Tribe was entitled to assert immunity here, the
proceedings could continue with the participation of Allergan,
which did not enjoy such immunity, and which was, according to
the Board, the “effective” patent owner.46
The Board pointed to statements by the Federal Circuit that the
“party that has been granted all substantial rights under the patent is
considered the owner regardless of how the parties characterize the
transaction that conveyed those rights.”47 Based on the terms of the
license between Allergan and the Tribe, the Board found that
Allergan was the effective patent owner in view of its possession of
“all substantial rights” in relation to the patents, including the right
to sue for infringement; the right to “indulge” any infringement; the
right to make, use, and sell products or services under the patents;
the right to sublicense; rights of reversion; the right to litigation or
licensing proceeds; the right to control prosecution and other
administrative proceedings; and the right to assign interests in the
41

Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 13, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5.
Id. at 14, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5.
43
Id. at 18, 2018 WL 1100950, at *7.
44
Id. at 16, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6.
45
Id. at 16–17, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6.
46
Id. at 35, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13.
47
Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Alfred
E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
42
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patents.48 The Board found that the recordation of Allergan’s
assignment of the patents to the Tribe at the USPTO only created “a
rebuttable presumption regarding ownership.”49 The Board held that
this presumption had been overcome, and that the proceedings could
continue with Allergan’s sole participation, as the “effective patent
owner,” regardless of whether tribal immunity applied.50
This conclusion led the Board to its fourth and final assertion,
that the inter partes review proceedings need not be terminated
because the Tribe was not an indispensable party. The Board held
that the Tribe would not “be significantly prejudiced in relation to
the merits of the patentability challenges in these proceedings” if it
did not participate based on its tribal immunity because Allergan, as
the effective patent owner, would be able to “adequately represent
any interests the Tribe may have in the challenged patents.”51
Notably, the briefing and evidence on the substantive patentability
issues at stake in these proceedings were completed before the
Tribe’s involvement.52 Accordingly, the Board concluded that the
Tribe had failed to show that it was entitled to assert tribal immunity
in these proceedings, that it was not an indispensable party to the
proceedings, and that the proceedings could continue with Allergan
as the effective patent owner.53 The Board denied the Tribe’s motion
to terminate the IPR proceedings.54
III. DECISION OF THE U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
In an opinion delivered on July 20, 2018, Judge Moore
distinguished this case from the facts of Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (“FMC”),55 in
which the Supreme Court held that state sovereign immunity
48

Mylan Pharm., No. IPR2016-01127, at 20–35, 2018 WL 1100950, at *8–13.
Id. at 34, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13.
50
Id. at 35, 2018 WL 1100950, at *13.
51
Id. at 37–38, 2018 WL 1100950, at *14.
52
Id. at 38, 2018 WL 1100950, at *14.
53
Id. at 40, 2018 WL 1100950, at *15.
54
Id.
55
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 764 (2002)).
49
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precluded the Federal Maritime Commission from adjudicating a
private party’s complaint against a state-run port. What
differentiated FMC from the present case, Moore reasoned, was that
Commission adjudications bear “overwhelming” similarities to
federal civil litigation between private parties, whereas IPR “is more
like an agency enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a
private party.”56 Judge Moore identified four characteristics that
distinguished IPR from adjudication between private parties. First,
the USPTO Director possesses broad discretion in deciding whether
to institute review and this “embraces the entirety of the
proceeding.”57 Accordingly, if IPR “proceeds on patents owned by
a tribe, it is because a politically accountable, federal official has
authorized the institution of that proceeding.”58 In contrast, the
Federal Maritime Commission has no discretion to refuse to
adjudicate complaints brought by private parties, meaning that a
private party could “unilaterally hale a sovereign before a tribunal,
presenting an affront to the dignity of the sovereign.”59 Secondly,
following the initiation of an IPR, the Board may proceed with
review even if the petitioner chooses not to participate,
demonstrating IPR’s higher purpose of permitting a federal agency
to reconsider the grant of a public franchise. Judge Moore found
Cuozzo Speed Techs and Oil States to be particularly persuasive in
this regard, echoing their obiter that “IPR is ‘simply a
reconsideration of’ the PTO’s original grant of a public franchise,
which serves to protect ‘the public’s paramount interest in seeing
that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.’”60
The third factor identified by Judge Moore to distinguish IPR
from private adjudication was the difference between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and USPTO procedures in IPR.61 Civil
litigation allows plaintiffs to significantly amend their complaints,
and to employ a host of discovery options including interrogatories,

56

Id. at 1327.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 1328.
60
Id. at 1327 (quoting Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC,
138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018)).
61
Id. at 1328.
57
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depositions, production demands, and requests for admission.62 IPR
petitioners may only make clerical or typographical corrections to
their petitions, and discovery is limited to the deposition of
witnesses submitting affidavits or declarations and “what is
otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”63 IPR hearings are
short and rarely permit live testimony, differentiating them
substantially from civil litigation hearings. The final factor
identified by Judge Moore to distinguish IPR from private
adjudication was the similarity between IPR and the other
“administrative agency reconsideration decisions” issued by the
USPTO, namely ex parte and inter partes reexamination.64 The
Tribe had acknowledged in oral argument that sovereign immunity
would not apply in these proceedings due to their inquisitorial
nature, and Judge Moore reasoned that IPR’s slightly less
inquisitorial nature did not preclude it from also being an
administrative agency reconsideration decision.65
Judge Moore concluded that, in instituting an IPR, the USPTO
“is acting as the United States in its role as a superior sovereign to
reconsider a prior administrative grant and protect the public interest
in keeping patent monopolies ‘within their legitimate scope.’”66
Accordingly, the Tribe could not rely on its immunity to bar such an
action. Judge Dyk, in his concurring opinion, also emphasized the
important public function of IPR in improving patent quality and
restoring public confidence in the presumption of patent validity by
giving the USPTO “‘a second look at an earlier administrative grant
of a patent.’”67 Judge Dyk provided a painstaking account of the
legislative history of IPR to illustrate its similarities with ex parte
and inter partes reexamination, seizing also on the Tribe’s
concession in oral argument that sovereign immunity would not
apply in either proceeding. Judge Dyk emphasized the enormous
62

Id.
Id. at 1328 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012)).
64
Id. at 1329.
65
Oral Argument, Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (No. 2018-1638), http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings
?title=&field_case_number_value=18-1638&field_date_value2%5Bvalue
%5D%5Bdate%5D= [https://perma.cc/5VH9-R9PQ].
66
Id. (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).
67
Id. at 1335 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).
63

2018]

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR RENT

779

responsibility of the USPTO (“the USPTO receives over 600,000
applications a year”) and its extremely limited resources, leading to
a lack of public confidence in the patent system and subsequent
judicial skepticism about patent validity.68 Reexamination, Judge
Dyk explained, was designed to restore faith in the presumption of
patent validity which many courts had come to treat as coextensive
with a presumption of administrative correctness.69 Ex parte
reexamination was introduced in 1980 “to use the motivation and
resources of third parties to improve the accuracy of the USPTO’s
patent process,” followed closely by inter partes reexamination in
1999.70 The participation of third parties in these processes was
designed not to simulate an adjudication between private parties,
Judge Dyk explained, but to leverage the vigilance of competitors in
the field seeking to invalidate an allegedly defective patent, as well
as their greater access to relevant prior art resources.71
In detailing this legislative history, Judge Dyk sought to show
that the eventual replacement of inter partes reexamination with,
among other things, inter partes review represented a change in
name rather than a change in substance. While IPR has some
features similar to civil litigation, Judge Dyk explained,
[A]t its core, it retains the purpose and many of the
procedures of its reexamination ancestors, to which
everybody agrees sovereign immunity does not
apply. Inter partes review is an administrative
proceeding designed to improve patent quality by
giving the USPTO “a second look at an earlier
administrative grant of a patent.”72
For these reasons, Judge Dyk concluded, like its predecessors ex
parte and inter partes reexamination, IPR is an agency
reconsideration that enlists third-party assistance and “in such a
reexamination proceeding, sovereign immunity does not apply.”73

68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 1331–32.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1335 (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144).
Id.
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The court affirmed the PTAB’s decision denying the Tribe’s motion
to dismiss IPR on the basis of tribal sovereign immunity.74
It is important to note that the court confined its decision to tribal
sovereign immunity alone. With respect to state sovereign
immunity, the court stated that, “[w]hile we recognize there are
many parallels, we leave for another day the question of whether
there is any reason to treat state sovereign immunity differently.”75
Both Judges Moore and Dyk, however, made reference to the
Supreme Court’s obiter in FMC that state sovereign immunity
“would not bar the Commission from ‘institut[ing] its own
administrative proceeding against a state-run port,’ even if that
proceeding were prompted by ‘information supplied by a private
party.’”76 Accordingly, whether states can continue to claim
immunity from IPR after this decision remains to be seen. Arguably,
the reasoning laid out by the Federal Circuit for barring tribal
sovereign immunity in IPR should compel a similar result for state
sovereign immunity, but this issue remains unresolved for now.
IV. CONSUMER WELFARE LOSS
The quid pro quo of the patent system lies in the public
disclosure of a useful invention in exchange for a time-limited
monopoly on the development, sale, and distribution of this
invention. The temporal restriction is important because, while this
monopoly exists, not all members of the public will be able to access
the patented invention at monopoly prices. The patent’s expiry is
critical for the entry of generic competitors selling the invention at
more affordable prices. In the exclusive pursuit of profit, however,
many patentees have attempted to extend their statutory monopolies
beyond their rightful term. Pharmaceutical patentees, in particular,
are notorious for their attempts to extend the duration of their patents
through evergreening, pay-for-delay agreements, and other
anticompetitive schemes.77 The unlawful extension of monopoly
74

Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1329.
76
Id. at 1330 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 768
(2002))(emphasis added).
77
Gregory H. Jones et al., Strategies That Delay or Prevent the Timely Availability of
Affordable Generic Drugs in the United States, 127 BLOOD J. 1398, 1398 (2016).
75
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pricing has significant adverse effects on consumer welfare;
“approximately one in five Americans do not fill prescriptions
because of prohibitive cost.”78 Pay-for-delay agreements are
estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers, insurance companies, and
consumers approximately $3.5 billion per year.79 Generic drugs, on
the other hand, have saved the U.S. health care system almost $1.5
trillion between 2004 and 2013.80 The Federal Trade Commission
estimates that within one year of market entry, authorized generics
sell for 15% of the price of brand name equivalents, generating
significant cost savings for consumers.81
One of the primary ways in which generic manufacturers can
actively ensure that patent terms are not unlawfully extended is by
challenging weak patents at the USPTO.82 The IPR process was
designed to provide an efficient and affordable venue for generic
firms to contest the patents held by brand-name pharmaceutical
firms without recourse to expensive and lengthy litigation.83 Under
this system, introduced with the America Invents Act in 2012, any
third party (not just a competitor in the same market) can petition
the USPTO for review of a patent on the basis that it fails to meet
the requirements for patentability.84 By relocating patent disputes
before an administrative body rather than a judge or jury, IPR was
intended to reduce the time, cost, and uncertainty of patent
litigation.85 Although any third party can file a petition,86 the scope
of the inquiry is limited to the validity of the patent, not any

78

Id.
Id. at 1399.
80
Id. at 1398.
81
Complaint and Jury Trial Demand at 13, In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic
Emulsion) Antitrust Litig. (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-02907), 2018 WL
2252507, at *7.
82
Jones et al., supra note 77, at 1401.
83
Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process
/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review (last visited Feb. 25, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/XL2U-ASK5].
84
See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012); Brian T. Apel, Note, An Administrative Meter Maid:
Using Inter Partes Review and Post-Grant Review to Curb Exclusivity Parking Via the
“Failure to Market” Provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 114 MICH. L. REV. 107, 115
(2015).
85
Apel, supra note 84, at 115.
86
35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012).
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allegations of infringement,87 and a final decision must be issued
within a year.88 In contrast, the median time to trial in patent
litigation is two and a half years.89 Additionally, the threshold for
initiating an IPR (“reasonable likelihood” that the petitioner will
prevail)90 is higher than that required for district court litigation (a
“short and plain statement” showing entitlement to relief),91
reducing the likelihood of frivolous petitioning creating a backlog
of cases.92 Once the IPR has been instituted, however, proof of
invalidity only requires a preponderance of the evidence,93 rather
than the “clear and convincing” evidence required by the district
court to overcome the presumption of validity.94 Additionally,
unlike in federal courts, claims are given the “broadest reasonable
construction in light of the specification” (meaning they are more
likely to overlap with prior art),95 and there is no presumption of
validity. IPRs are estimated to incur fees of approximately $300,000
to $500,000 due to their limited duration and scope, whereas patent
litigation can require several million dollars.96 Finally, the
institution of an IPR is often successfully utilized by defendants to
seek a stay of any co-pending infringement litigation relating to the
same patent, thereby freezing district court litigation costs.97
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35 U.S.C. § 311 (b) (2012). The scope of discovery is also limited relative to that
permitted in the district court. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5), with FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1).
88
35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).
89
Apel, supra note 84, at 125.
90
35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
92
Apel, supra note 84, at 124.
93
35 U.S.C. § 316(e).
94
See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (presumption of validity); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97 (2011) (“Under the Federal Circuit’s reading of § 282, a defendant
seeking to overcome [the presumption of patent validity] must persuade the factfinder of
its in-validity defense by clear and convincing evidence.”).
95
37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (2018).
96
Apel, supra note 84, at 125–26.
97
Matthew Rizzolo et al., Shielded by Sovereignty: The Implications for Patentees of
Covidien v. University of Florida Research Foundation and its Progeny, 45 AIPLA Q.J.
593, 601–02 (2017).
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Illustrating its popularity, over 7,573 IPRs were filed between 2012
and 2018.98
The ability to invalidate patents prior to the end of their term is
critical to ensuring that invalid patents do not deter market entry,
distort innovation, reduce competition, decrease consumer
welfare,99 and undermine public confidence in the patent bargain.
While the grant of a patent creates a presumption of validity, it is
capable of being rebutted. The Hatch–Waxman framework
deliberately introduced incentives for generic manufacturers to
challenge the validity of brand name patents, for example, by
obviating the need to repeat safety and efficacy tests when filing an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) demonstrating
bioequivalence to an approved drug.100 ANDA applicants must
demonstrate that no patent would be infringed by the granting of the
ANDA either because (i.) no patent exists; (ii.) the patent has
expired; (iii.) the patent will soon expire; or (iv.) the patent is
invalid.101 Hatch-Waxman incentivized patent challenges under
paragraph IV by granting 180 days of market exclusivity to generic
manufacturers who successfully challenged patents under this
process (the so-called “first filer” advantage).102
Accordingly, Elana Williams argues that Allergan’s attempt to
unlawfully extend its Restasis® monopoly by avoiding invalidation
through IPR is “exactly what Congress in enacting the HatchWaxman Act sought to avoid.”103 Generic competitors “must be
allowed to enter the market through Congressionally created
mechanisms such as IPR in order to provide consumers with lowcost options to the medications they desperately need.”104
Weaponizing tribal sovereign immunity to shield corporate
98

Patent Trial & Appeal Bd., Trial Statistics: IPR, PGR, CBM, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. 3 (Feb.2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial_statistics
_20180228.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEZ8-7FHL].
99
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN. L. REV. 101, 114 (2006).
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Apel, supra note 84, at 109, 111–12.
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Apel, supra note 84, at 112–13.
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Apel, supra note 84, at 109.
103
Elana Williams, Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Defense in Overcoming IPR
Challenges of Brand Name Pharmaceutical Patent Validity at PTAB—Effects on the
Industry, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 40 , 57 (2018).
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Id. at 58.
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monopoly power from generic competition has significant
anticompetitive effects, including a welfare loss for consumers. It
inflates the probabilistic value of Allergan’s patents beyond that
created by the initial grant of market exclusivity by artificially
eliminating sources of competition, in this case, generic firms.105 By
shielding weak patents from potential invalidation through inter
partes review, Allergan is extending its market monopoly beyond its
rightful limits, thereby maintaining price inflation and harming
consumers who cannot afford Restasis® at current prices.
In a separate judgment accompanying his invalidation of
Allergan’s Restasis® patents for obviousness, U.S. Circuit Judge
William Bryson criticized Allergan’s assignment of its patents to the
Tribe: “[w]hat Allergan seeks is the right to continue to enjoy the
considerable benefits of the U.S. patent system without accepting
the limits that Congress has placed on those benefits through the
administrative mechanism for canceling invalid patents.”106 Judge
Bryson expressed concern that Allergan’s strategy would be adopted
by other pharmaceutical firms also seeking to shield their patents
from administrative review: “[i]f that ploy succeeds, any patentee
facing IPR proceedings would presumably be able to defeat those
proceedings by employing the same artifice. In short, Allergan’s
tactic, if successful, could spell the end of the PTO’s IPR program,
which was a central component of the America Invents Act of
2011.”107 Judge Bryson compared Allergan’s patent assignment to
abusive tax shelter transactions, in which courts have “looked
behind the face of the transactions to determine whether the
transactions have economic substance or are simply a method of
gaming the . . . system to generate benefits that were not intended to
be available.”108
A coalition of American health care organizations expressed
similar concern at the harm posed by Allergan’s transaction to
consumer welfare:
105

Cecilia (Yixi) Cheng & Theodore T. Lee, When Patents Are Sovereigns: The
Competitive Harms of Leasing Tribal Immunity, 127 YALE L.J. F. 848, 852 (2018).
106
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790,
at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
107
Id.
108
Id. at *3.
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The actions taken by Allergan to ensure that patients
and payors do not benefit from timely generic
competition to Restasis® is an alarming new
example of the steps that brand name drug companies
will take to put profits above the public interest . . . .
If left unchallenged, this potentially precedentsetting transfer of patents to Native American tribes
to avoid lawful review of these government-granted
monopolies may represent the beginning of a
lucrative business strategy at the expense of the
public interest, thus jeopardizing timely access to
lower-cost generic and biosimilar medicines.109
Dallas-based lawyer Michael Shore, who brokered the AllerganTribe assignment, however, has been candid about his desire to
“destroy the IPR process” by creating sufficient loopholes to compel
congressional review.110 On a Teleforum podcast aired in January
2018, he explained his intention to carve out such a loophole that
“anyone can go to a sovereign, whether it’s a state sovereign or a
tribal sovereign, and get in a time machine and go back to 2011,”
prior to the introduction of the America Invents Act.111 His
motivation, he explained, was to make the IPR system “more fair”
by eliminating the “huge arbitrage in value between sovereigns and
non-sovereigns.”112 Shore believes that the IPR process “grossly
favors infringers,” to the detriment of patent holders. He describes
the “insanity” of a process in which “no patent is presumed valid,
no matter how much you’ve invested in it, no matter how much work
you’ve done on it.”113 He argues that the introduction of the IPR
process has “literally destroyed” the U.S. patent system, and he is
simply trying to “take us back to a time when we had the number
one innovative economy in the world.”114 Shore believes that the
invalidation of patents through district court litigation is preferable
109

All. of Cmty. Health Plans et al., supra note 21, at 3.
New Frontiers for Tribal Immunity: Patents, Pharmaceuticals, and the PTAB, THE
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 30, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/events/new-frontiers-for-tribalimmunity-patents-pharmaceuticals-and-the-ptab [https://perma.cc/5YZX-JJGU].
111
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to the IPR process because of the legal protections that exist for
patentees: the ordinary person skilled in the art standard, a jury, a
presumption of validity, the ability to cross-examine expert
testimony, and a “clear and convincing evidence” standard.115
Shore’s arguments echo Allergan’s defense of its transaction as
protection against the “double jeopardy” of fielding both federal
lawsuits and IPR proceedings.116 Ironically, however, in 2016, at a
time when pharmaceutical firms were facing heightened media,
political, and regulatory scrutiny (largely thanks to the public antics
of “pharma bro” Martin Shkreli),117 Allergan publicly committed to
a “social contract” with patients, which promised that Allergan
would “not engage in price gouging actions or predatory pricing,”
would “enhance access” for patients, and would limit annual price
increases in line with inflation.118 Whatever goodwill was generated
by this social contract was quickly consumed by the media storm
that followed the announcement of the Allergan-Tribe transaction in
2017. Public shifts in the access policies of pharmaceutical firms
seem more closely tied to swings in public sentiment than
underlying changes in corporate policy; particularly those tied to the
generation of profit for shareholders. Resultingly, consumer welfare
continues to weather significant losses.
In November 2017, Restasis® purchasers filed an antitrust suit
against Allergan, claiming damages for its anticompetitive
conduct.119 The class action claims that,
In the absence of Allergan’s unlawful actions,
generic Restasis® would have been available by
115
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Sy Mukherjee, Botox Maker Allergan’s CEO Defends Selling Drug Patents to Native
(Sept.
9,
2017),
American
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to
Thwart
Rivals,
FORTUNE
http://fortune.com/2017/09/09/allergan-drug-patents-native-american/
[https://perma.cc/5FSY-5YS3].
117
See, e.g., Andrew Pollack & Matthew Goldstein, Martin Shkreli All but Gloated Over
Huge Drug Price Increases, Memos Show, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/03/business/drug-makers-calculated-price-increaseswith-profit-in-mind-memos-show.html [https://perma.cc/JC7W-B3GX].
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Brent Saunders, Our Social Contract with Patients, ALLERGAN: CEO BLOG (Sept. 6,
2016), https://www.allergan.com/news/ceo-blog/september-2016/our-social-contract-with
-patients [https://perma.cc/4VJ5-ABCK].
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No. 2:17-cv-00747 (E.D. Tex. 2017).
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May 17, 2014 and direct purchasers would have
purchased the less expensive generic. FWK
Holdings, LLC and the proposed class have paid
hundreds of millions of dollars in overcharges as a
result of Allergan’s anticompetitive scheme.120
Six months later, a similar suit was brought against Allergan by
four major U.S. retailers: Walgreen Co., Kroger, Albertsons and
HEB. The antitrust action alleges that Allergan’s anticompetitive
conduct (including the patent assignment to the Tribe) “had the
purpose and effect of restraining competition unreasonably and
injuring competition by protecting Restasis® from generic
competition,” with the effect that the plaintiffs were “compelled to
pay, did pay, and continue to pay, artificially inflated prices for their
[Restasis] requirements” and have incurred “substantial injury to
their business and property in the form of overcharges.”121 These
lawsuits reflect the ripple effects of the Allergan-Tribe transaction,
not just in terms of the harm to consumers (reduced access to
affordable medicines) but also in terms of the anticompetitive
effects on purchasers and retailers.
V. HISTORY OF ECONOMIC OPPRESSION OF
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES
Allergan’s attempt to protect $1.4 billion122 in annual sales of a
blockbuster drug by renting a legal protection designed for a
historically disenfranchised community represents a new frontier in
abuses of the patent system. Perhaps more disturbingly, however, it
reflects the limited utility of this legal protection to a community
with insufficient economic opportunities.
Tribal sovereign immunity, like that of states, finds its roots in
the common law. The doctrine developed out of the “international
public law doctrine of nation-state sovereign immunity,” and the
120

Class Action Complaint & Jury Trial Demand at 3, FWK Holdings, LLC v. Allergan,
Inc., 2017 WL 5513947 (E.D. Tex.) (No. 2:17-cv-00747).
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Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, supra note 81, at 37 para. 109, 39 paras. 115–16.
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Allergan, Plc, Annual Report: 2017 Form 10-K, ALLERGAN 59 (Feb. 16, 2018),
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need to protect the dignity of sovereigns, as well as their
treasuries.123 The United States Supreme Court first formally
recognized tribal sovereign immunity in the early twentieth century
in cases involving the Cherokee Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and
the Creek Nation.124 In these early cases, judicial recognition of the
sovereignty of Indian tribes often referenced as “indicators” of
sovereignty their political organization, independent legislatures,
exclusive territorial domain, treaties with the United States, distinct
political community, and written laws and constitutions.125 Prior to
the formation of the United States, the British Crown had interacted
with Indian tribes as foreign sovereigns for the purposes of
commercial trade, negotiation, diplomacy, and treaty-making.126
Even after Congress changed its policy from diplomacy to
regulation in 1871, Indian tribes retained the sovereignty inherent in
their status as self-governing peoples predating the U.S.
Constitution.127 In its current form, the boundaries of tribal
sovereign immunity lie where tribes have consented to being sued
or Congress has unequivocally expressed128 its intent to abrogate the
scope of the immunity.129 State sovereign immunity arises from the
states’ inherent sovereignty prior to ratification of the U.S.
Constitution and is affirmed by the Eleventh Amendment.130 Tribal
123

William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereignty Immunity Story, 62
AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1610, 1615 (2013); see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition
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309 U.S. 506 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919).
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sovereign immunity, however, receives no constitutional protection.
As a result, both Congress and the Executive Branch have played a
greater role in defining the contours of tribal immunity.131 Yet,
Gregory Ablavsky argues that the justifications for sovereign
immunity “apply with as much or greater force in the tribal context”
than they do in the state context.132 When compared to U.S. states,
Native nations continue to have substantially less capital and less
capacity to raise capital through taxation.133 More than 26% of
American Indians and Alaskan Natives lived in poverty in 2016, the
highest of any racial group.134 In these circumstances, the function
of sovereign immunity to protect sovereign treasuries from the
financial burden of litigation increases in importance.
Recent decisions of the PTAB, however, reflect preferential
treatment of state sovereign immunity when used to shield patents
owned by state universities from inter partes review. In May 2017,
the PTAB granted the University of Maryland’s motion to terminate
IPR proceedings on the basis of its sovereign immunity as an “arm
of the State of Maryland.”135 Four months earlier, the PTAB had
dismissed another IPR proceeding due to the Florida Research
Foundation’s sovereign immunity.136 The PTAB’s willingness to
dismiss IPR petitions for patents owned by state sovereigns was
precisely what motivated Michael Shore to broker the AllerganTribe transaction in the belief that tribal immunity would receive
similar treatment.137 The basis for the PTAB’s differential treatment
the other States) except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments.”); see also Gregory J. Wong, Intent Matters: Assessing Sovereign Immunity
for Tribal Entities, 82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 209 (2007).
131
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132
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133
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134
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2017, PROFILE AM. FACTS FOR FEATURES 5 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.census.gov
/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VFD-JY2R].
135
See NeoChord, Inc. v. Univ. of Md., Balt., No. IPR2016-00208, at 4 (P.T.A.B. May
23, 2017).
136
See Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., Nos. IPR2016-01274,
IPR2016-01275, IPR2016-01276, at 3 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
137
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of state and tribal immunity remains unclear; the Board referred to
statements by the Supreme Court that “the immunity possessed by
Indian Tribes is not coextensive with that of the States,”138 and
argued that lower courts, therefore, have “not always considered
Supreme Court precedent concerning state sovereign immunity to
be applicable in the context of tribal immunity.”139 The PTAB then
referred to obiter from Kiowa (“‘[t]here are reasons to doubt the
wisdom of perpetuating the [tribal immunity] doctrine’”) and “the
recognized differences between the state sovereign immunity and
tribal immunity doctrines” (without further elucidation) before
denying the Tribe’s motion to dismiss the IPR proceedings.140
Some distinguishing characteristics between Covidien,
NeoChord, and the present case may be illustrative. Firstly, at the
time that the IPR was originally initiated, the relevant patents in
Covidien and NeoChord were already owned by a sovereign, unlike
the present case, in which ownership changed hands after the IPR
had already been instituted, clearly for the purpose of dismissing the
proceedings.141 Secondly, Eleventh Amendment immunity is
considered a valid defense to adjudicative administrative
proceedings brought by a private party,142 and tribal immunity does
not enjoy such constitutional protection.143 Thirdly, the unique
fiduciary relationship between the federal government and Indian
“domestic dependent nations”144 has been held to bar the invocation
of sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit has noted that “tribal
immunity is generally not asserted in administrative proceedings
because tribes cannot impose sovereign immunity to bar the federal
138
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government from exercising its trust obligations,” and that “tribal
sovereignty does not extend to prevent the federal government from
exercising its superior sovereign powers.”145 The significance of
these differences has yet to be tested; the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit explicitly confined its decision to tribal
sovereign immunity alone, and left the differential treatment of state
sovereign immunity “for another day.”146
Certainly, the policy reasons for denying the application of
sovereign immunity that has been “rented” by private corporations
to avoid administrative review should apply equally to state
sovereigns. As the Oglala Sioux Tribe argued in its amicus brief,
comparing the role of the University of Florida Research Foundation
to that of the Tribe in this case, “[b]oth merely took an assignment
of the patent or patents in question for purposes of monetizing the
patents through licensing and generating royalty revenue.”147
Indeed, Michael Shore has expressed his intent, if Congress limits
tribal immunity in inter partes review, to shift patent portfolios to
state universities (e.g. underfunded historically black colleges) to
exploit their state sovereign immunity.148 Faced with the same
concerns regarding corporate abuse of the patent system, the
technical differences between state and tribal sovereign immunity
do not seem to justify disabling tribal immunity in inter partes
review while preserving that of states.149
In fact, the differential treatment of state and tribal immunity in
these circumstances suggests a broader delegitimization of this core
legal protection for tribal communities. William Wood argues that
the Supreme Court’s mischaracterization of the development of
tribal sovereign immunity “almost by accident” in Kiowa150 has
triggered a broader jurisprudential trend of delegitimizing tribal
145
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sovereign immunity, in which lower federal courts and state
supreme courts are more willing to “carve out exceptions to the
doctrine” and “make their own policy judgments about whether
immunity should apply—and to tip the balance against upholding
immunity.”151 In TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,152 for example, the
Fifth Circuit noted that Kiowa provided reasons to “doubt the
wisdom” of perpetuating tribal sovereign immunity, and held that
this immunity “did not bar an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the tribe.”153 Wood argues that exceptions
to the application of tribal sovereign immunity have similarly been
carved out by courts in California and Oklahoma on the basis of
Kiowa obiter.154 Kiowa’s criticism of the “wisdom of perpetuating
the doctrine” of tribal immunity,155 Wood claims, has encouraged
lower courts to place limitations on tribal immunity despite its
longstanding congressional recognition.156
Certainly, the PTAB’s February decision to deny the operation
of tribal sovereign immunity in inter partes review significantly
curtails the operability of a core legal protection for American
Indians, with unpredictable consequences. Retaining meaningful
control over whether sovereign immunity is waived or invoked can
have a significant impact on the capacity and legitimacy of tribal
court systems, as well as the scope of their jurisdiction.157 Preserving
tribal immunity allows tribes to strengthen and develop their own
legal systems, for example, by reincorporating traditional norms
which may have been removed through the colonization of tribal
justice systems (e.g. alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,
such as peacemaker courts, and internal grievance procedures).158
Immunity from suit remains a core legal protection and should not
be lightly curtailed. As Andrea Seielstad reiterates, tribal immunity
“derives its existence from the presumed and long-recognized
151
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inherent sovereignty of Indian nations. The doctrine is not easily
disturbed, and interpretive deviations from the general rule should
be cautiously undertaken.”159 Any challenge to such immunity must
confront a “longstanding inter-branch jurisprudential legacy” that
has “consistently endorsed a federal policy and jurisprudence
protective of tribal immunity.”160 While the PTAB’s anxiety to
preclude abuses of the patent system is understandable, abrogating
tribal sovereign immunity without congressional oversight is not the
solution.
Interestingly, in Covidien, the PTAB had earlier dismissed the
argument that immunizing patents owned by sovereigns would have
“harmful and far-reaching consequences,” as invalid patents would
stand simply because they were assigned to sovereign entities.161
The Board was unpersuaded that “an application of sovereign
immunity to inter partes review [would] do violence to the patent
system” and stated that “there is no evidence that the harm to the
patent system, described by the Petitioner, will come to pass, let
alone exists as a basis to divest States of sovereign immunity.”162
Yet, less than a month later, the Board handed down a very different
decision in which it denied the application of tribal immunity to inter
partes review on the basis of seemingly trivial differences between
state and tribal immunity.163 It is possible that the media storm and
public outrage which followed the announcement of the AllerganTribe transaction may have contributed to a shift in perception of the
social utility of immunizing patents held by sovereigns, but this
remains speculation.
The technology transfer offices of public universities are
reportedly concerned that the trendline of recent cases, namely, the
PTAB’s February decision and the Federal Circuit’s July decision,
may ultimately sprout federal legislation which abrogates all
sovereign immunity before the PTAB, thereby “crippling” the
innovation spurred by the Bayh-Dole Act and imposing significant
159
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financial burdens on state universities as they are forced to defend
themselves before inter partes review.164 If the financial burdens of
sovereigns were to legitimately influence a decision to shield them
from inter partes review, however, surely the dire financial
circumstances of American Indian tribes would be more compelling.
A small community in upstate New York with an annual budget of
only $50 million to support 13,000 people,165 the Saint Regis
Mohawk Tribe had already agreed to hold supercomputer patents
for SRC Labs as part of its economic diversification strategy.166
SRC Labs had transferred its patents to the Tribe in August 2017 in
order to use tribal immunity as a shield from counter-challenge
through inter partes review. In October 2017, the Tribe filed lawsuits
against Microsoft and Amazon for infringement of these patents.167
The Tribe’s willingness to rent its sovereign immunity to patent
holders in exchange for upfront payments reflects the financial
strain of a legacy of colonial oppression of American Indians
through federal policy and judicial decisions.168 The effective
promotion of tribal self-sufficiency, sovereignty, and political selfdetermination relies in large part on economic independence from
federal funds. And despite popular misconceptions, Indian gaming
revenue is unevenly distributed and largely insufficient.169 Of the
562 federally recognized Indian Nations, less than half operate
gaming facilities.170 And on the thirtieth anniversary of the Indian
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Gaming Regulatory Act,171 billions of dollars in gaming revenue
have failed to systematically reduce tribal poverty levels (the
median poverty rate for gaming tribes in Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, and Alaska actually increased over 2000-2010 from 25% to
29%, despite $19 billion in gaming revenue), and there is evidence
of an inverse correlation between per capita payments and poverty
reduction.172 Additionally, taxation revenue from businesses located
on Indian reservations has been crowded out by parallel state
taxation powers.173 Dual taxation forces tribes to reduce their tax
rates or forfeit tax revenue altogether in order to maintain market
pricing, yet the threat of double taxation continues to frighten
investors away.174 Despite tribal taxation powers representing “an
essential attribute of Indian sovereignty,”175 tribes’ ability to
generate taxation revenue or offer tax incentives to stimulate
economic activity has been sharply curtailed by “flexible
preemption analysis” decisions.176 Naturally, in these
circumstances, tribes seeking additional revenue streams to support
the needs of their members are more willing to “rent” their sovereign
immunity for financial reward. The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe has
acknowledged that the upfront payment of $13.75 million followed
by quarterly royalty payments of $3.75 million from Allergan will
allow it “to address some of the chronically unmet needs of the
Akwesasne community, such as housing, employment, education,
healthcare, cultural and language preservation.”177
Interestingly, the Tribe’s participation in this transaction has
also been justified, not only by its significant economic needs, but
by the long history of unlawful appropriation of Native American
inventions in the United States. The Native American Intellectual
Property Enterprise Council, in its amicus brief to the PTAB,
171
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justified the assignment of Restasis® patents to the Tribe on the
basis that
Appropriation and outright theft of Native American
inventions and ideas without attribution has occurred
for hundreds of years. The curing of rubber, the game
of Lacrosse, tortillas, potato chips, root beer, and
innumerable planting, cultivation, crossbreeding,
and cooking techniques and inventions were all
Native American in origin, yet the Tribes saw little
or no benefits aside from occasional lip service.178
Framing Allergan’s patent assignment as a form of
intergenerational equity (when in fact its only purpose was to protect
Allergan’s Restasis® revenue) suggests an alarming form of
vigilante justice that should not be encouraged. Denying U.S.
patients access to affordable generic medicines in order to remedy
the historical deprivation of intellectual property rights to Native
American tribes seems like a misguided attempt to correct one
wrong by committing another. Justifying abuse of the patent system
“in order to overcome significant historical disadvantages”179 faced
by Native American tribes is misdirected and unsustainable.
Certainly, the U.S. government should be doing more to compensate
Indian tribes for centuries of oppression, discrimination, and
resource appropriation, but back-door vigilantism by means of
crippling inter partes review is not an appropriate remedy.
Understanding the motivation for tribal participation in this
transaction does not diminish its effect on consumer welfare and the
underlying patent bargain. In granting patent rights, society agreed
to provide inventors with a time-limited monopoly in return for the
release of information concerning socially beneficial innovation.
The financial needs and historical suffering of American Indians,
while important, have no bearing on this bargain. For this reason,
inter partes review cannot and should not be manipulated to serve
extraneous objectives while there continue to exist alternative (and
more appropriate) means of achieving them.

178
179
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VI. LOOKING FORWARD
The harms caused by the commodification of sovereign
immunity for corporate profit (including the loss to consumer
welfare and the narrowing of tribal immunity) demonstrate that
sustainable solutions are needed for the future. Identifying the
optimal solution, however, is extremely difficult. Scholars at Yale
argue that patent assignments that make no economic sense but for
their anticompetitive purpose (in this case, shielding patents from
invalidation by generic competitors) should be subject to antitrust
scrutiny.180 Cheng and Lee argue that bringing an antitrust suit to
challenge an anticompetitive patent assignment would be a “natural
extension” of FTC v. Actavis, in which the Supreme Court held that
antitrust law can apply to reverse payment agreements between
brand name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.181 The “no
economic sense” test, they argue, would capture the most egregious
anticompetitive conduct without unduly eroding sovereign
immunity, or chilling legitimate patent transfers.182 This would
prevent abuse of the patent system by prohibiting anticompetitive
patent assignments without touching the question of sovereign
immunity.
Alternatively, bipartisan legislation has been proposed that
would strip both states and tribes of sovereign immunity in inter
partes review. The Preserving Access to Cost Effective Drugs Act
(the “PACED Act”), introduced in March 2018 by Senators Cotton,
McCaskill, Perdue, Ernst, and Toomey, would amend title 35 of the
United States Code to provide that “a patent owner may not assert
sovereign immunity, including the sovereign immunity accorded to
an Indian tribe” in derivation, reexamination, inter partes review,
and post-grant review proceedings (and federal reviews thereof), but
“only to the extent permitted under the 11th amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”183 Whether such statutory
language would be sufficient to abrogate state sovereign
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immunity,184 or whether the actual effect of the PACED Act would
be to exclusively penalize tribes while permitting states to continue
invoking immunity, remains to be seen. The Bill has been referred
to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
An alternative solution, suggested by Greg Ablavsky and Lisa
Ouellette, would be to encourage states to waive immunity in inter
partes review by making the receipt of federal research funds
conditioned upon such a waiver.185 Given the importance of federal
funding to the continuity of university-based research and
development, this incentive could be persuasive. Jennifer Polse,
focusing on patent infringement proceedings in federal court,
originally argued that conditioning the receipt of federal research
funds on the waiver of sovereign immunity in patent suits would
ensure that federal funds are not used to violate federal patent law.186
According to Polse, obtaining a waiver from states in this manner is
the only way to hold state universities accountable for patent
infringement after Florida Prepaid II effectively “close[d] the door
to future legislative attempts to abrogate state immunity from suit
for patent infringement.”187 Importantly, to avoid triggering the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions (in which the significant
financial inducement of a federal research grant may effectively
coerce states into giving up their constitutional rights),188 a modified
solution would be to withhold only a percentage of federal research
funds from states which refuse to waive their immunity in inter
partes review.189
184
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In its departure from its intended purpose, the monetization of
tribal sovereign immunity clearly reflects the desperate state of
tribal finances.190 Accordingly, a more sustainable means of
discouraging anticompetitive patent transfers would involve
identifying alternative revenue streams for American Indian tribes.
As aforementioned, tribal taxation revenue has been severely
decimated by the threat of double taxation due to increasingly
generous judicial interpretations of state taxation powers. If,
however, Congress were to grant immunities from state tax in
specific contexts (as it did with gaming under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act),191 it would significantly bolster tribal revenue
streams on a sustainable, long-term basis.192 Natural resource
development represents a significant revenue stream for many
tribes, and there exists tremendous potential to generate renewable
energy through wind and solar power.193 Indian lands hold an
estimated 535 billion kWh/year of wind and 17,600 billion
kWh/year of solar-energy potential.194 Yet harnessing this energy
requires capital-intensive technologies and non-Indian investment,
which again raises the specter of double taxation.195 Tribes do not
enjoy the renewable energy tax credits, accelerated depreciation
allowances, and loan guarantees that make renewable energy
projects profitable for investors.196 Additionally, as tribes are
generally excluded from regional transmission line planning,
transmission lines often skirt tribal lands, and the cost of relocating
190

As U.S. Circuit Judge William Bryson stated in his 2017 opinion invalidating
Allergan’s Restasis® patents, “sovereign immunity should not be treated as a monetizable
commodity that can be purchased by private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal
responsibilities. It is not an inexhaustible asset that can be sold to any party that might find
it convenient to purchase immunity from suit.” See Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
191
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4) (1988).
192
Willis, supra note 174, at 4.
193
Heather J. Tanana & John C. Ruple, Energy Development in Indian Country: Working
Within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving Towards Collaboration, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2012).
194
Id.
195
Id. at 11.
196
The New Energy Future in Indian Country: Confronting Climate Change, Creating
Jobs,
and
Conserving
Nature,
NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N
16
(2010),
https://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Global-Warming/Reports/03-2310_NWF_TribalLands_LoRes.ashx [https://perma.cc/H4XQ-A3NK].

800

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:767

or extending these lines closer to tribal lands would be
prohibitive.197 Renewable energy investment, therefore, represents
a significant source of untapped tribal revenue and employment. If
Congress were to establish immunities from state tax for renewable
energy developments, this exemption would significantly bolster
tribal revenue streams and obviate the need to monetize sovereign
immunity.198 Discouraging imitation of the Allergan-Tribe
transaction “requires more than a stopgap narrowly focused on the
use of tribal sovereign immunity in inter partes review proceedings
challenging drug patents.”199 It requires sustainable, long-term
solutions which address the root causes that motivate these
transactions, namely, serious financial need.
A more compelling but likely less feasible solution would be to
return title to Indian land to tribes under a new status that confers
permanent jurisdiction and full taxation powers.200 The U.S.
government’s ownership of Indian land (held in trust for tribes)201
means that tribes cannot sell, lease, develop, or mortgage their land
without the express approval of the U.S. government, which
unreasonably burdens and hinders tribal entrepreneurship and
economic development.202 In addition to erecting significant
bureaucratic barriers to economic growth, the trust status of Indian
resources “freezes” tribal assets in a pre-capitalist state.203 The
Indian Trust Asset Reform Act, for example, allows participating
tribes to assume responsibility for the management of trust assets
according to tribal standards, notwithstanding federal regulations.204
197
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This step, although small, could represent the start of a “new
approach to tribal self-determination that would allow for greater
tribal authority and flexibility in the management of trust assets,
including surface and potentially subsurface resources for energy
development.”205 Greater legislative creativity and courage could
significantly alter the pattern of tribal engagement with their
resources and reclaim the control and self-determination that has
been denied them for centuries. This paper is not the appropriate
place to discuss the incredibly complex and controversial issues
relating to tribal land held in trust by the United States. Suffice to
say that, rather than narrowing the scope of an important legal
protection for American Indian tribes, a more effective deterrent to
future imitations of the Allergan-Tribe transaction would be to
significantly buttress the economic opportunities afforded to
American Indian communities in a sustainable and meaningful
fashion.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Although the optimal resolution of the issues raised herein
remains unclear, two conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing
discussion. Firstly, pharmaceutical firms should not be permitted to
rent sovereign immunity (state or tribal) in order to extend their
patent monopolies beyond their lawful terms, to the detriment of
U.S. consumers. The effective functions of inter partes review
should be preserved in order to maintain consumer access to
affordable generic medicines. Secondly, the willingness of the Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe to rent its sovereign immunity in return for
lump-sum payments reflects the dire financial circumstances of
many Indian tribes and the economic legacy of centuries of
oppression. These financial needs should be addressed, not by
curtailing the scope of an already limited legal protection, but by
identifying sustainable, long-term sources of tribal revenue that
would obviate the financial need to engage in anticompetitive patent
assignments with pharmaceutical firms. Unless and until Congress
acts to reverse centuries of economic oppression of American
Indians, these transactions will continue to be lucrative for tribes,
205
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and U.S. consumers will continue to suffer a lack of access to
affordable medicines.

